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I. INTRODUCTION
For a Canadian, there is some irony in learning that rediscovering the
American dream may turn decisively on resuscitating federalism and clarifying
the division of powers between the central government and the federated units,
as Dr. Alice Rivlin suggests in Reviving the American Dream.1 After all,
Canadians have spent all too much time in this century worrying about an
optimal division of powers between the orders of government. If there were
an export market for proposals detailing alternate forms of federal organiza-
tion, Canada would have few, if any, trade rivals. More often than not,
Canadians are embarrassed by this preoccupation, believing that they are
diverting attention from concrete matters of policy. Instead of worrying so
much about who ought to exercise power over various policy domains, why
not pay more attention to what the policy ought to be? In that sense, Rivlin's
suggestion that rethinking federalism may increase living standards comes as
a tremendous relief. Maybe Canadians haven't been wasting their time after
all.
Nevertheless, I find myself skeptical about the decentralization scheme
Rivlin proposes. My concerns are four-fold and linked in different ways to the
Canadian and European experiences. First, the principle by which Rivlin
would reallocate jurisdiction is unclear and possibly unsound. Second, the
competitive federalism resulting from this jurisdictional reallocation may
produce a race to the bottom rather than a race to the top. Third, shifting
federal responsibilities to the states without providing guaranteed tax revenue
will simply transfer the federal debt burden to the states and exacerbate
inequalities among states. Fourth, the Canadian experience suggests that a
more decentralized federation is not necessarily better at managing its debt
problem.
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These comments are not meant as a broadside against efforts to recast and
modernize federalism. Rivlin is right that central governments have a
significant burden to marshall their fiscal and administrative resources and to
identify those functions that they can best fulfill. This paper concludes,
therefore, with some praise for the virtues of federalism and support for
efforts to reinvigorate it.
II. ALLOCATING JURISDICTION
Under Rivlin's recipe for "dividing the job" between the federal govern-
ment and the states, the federal government would shrink and the state and
local sectors would expand.2 However, the federal government would take
on one new job: implementing a national health financing system. New areas
of state responsibility would center on a "productivity agenda" for revitalizing
the economy and raising incomes: education, skills training, child care,
housing, infrastructure, and economic development.3
By what principle is jurisdiction being divided under this scheme? This
question may seem unfair, as Rivlin does not intend to present a comprehen-
sive blueprint for the devolution of federal jurisdiction or to propose sweeping
constitutional change or any court-enforced realignment of government
responsibilities. She seeks instead to outline a general policy framework. If
a coherent principle of jurisdictional allocation cannot be gleaned from the
general contours of this proposal, however, one is entitled to wonder how
closely it withstands scrutiny.
The jurisdictional reallocation may be based on an implicit principle of
subsidiarity, for Rivlin seems to assume that jurisdiction should not be
allocated to the federal government unless there is a compelling reason to do
so. Subsidiarity has been a governing principle for the European Community,
most explicitly since the Single European Act.4 This principle was inspired
by an encyclical of Pope Pius XI that linked subsidiarity to justice and human
prosperity:
[It is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and distrubance [sic] of right order to
assign to a greater and higher organization what lesser and subordinate organizations can
do .... Therefore, those in power should be sure that the more perfectly a graduated order
is kept among the various associations, in observance of the principle of "subsidiary
function," the stronger social authority and effectiveness will be[,] the happier and more
prosperous the condition of the state.5
2. Id. at 116-25.
3. Id. at 118.
4. Single European Act of February 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L. 169) 7. For a discussion of subsidiarity,
see Joel P. Trachtman, L'ta, C'estNous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and Subsidiarity, 33 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 459 (1992).
5. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter Quadragesimo Anno §§ 79-80 (1931), translated in 3 PAPAL
ENcYcLIcAS 1903-1939, at 415, 428 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1990); see also Ludger Kfihnhardt, Federalism
and Subsidiarity, 91 TELos 77 (1992).
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However, the principle of subsidiarity is of little use in allocating jurisdiction.
It begs the central question: what tasks can be accomplished fully by smaller
communities? These smaller communities need not be states. In Germany, for
example, voluntary associations, not just Ldnder, play an integral role in
federal social assistance legislation.6 European subsidiarity has given rise to
a "new regionalism" that supersedes national governments. 7
To enhance economic stability, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa explains:
The principle of subsidiarity means that the production of public goods should be assigned
to the level of government that has jurisdiction over the area in which that good is
public .... Only indivisibilities, economies of scale, externalities and strategic requirements
are accepted as efficiency arguments in favour of allocating powers to higher levels of
government.8
Does Rivlin's jurisdictional allocation fit such a framework of subsidiarity?
Arguably yes, yet there are certain ambiguities that are discussed below.
A. Assigning Tasks to the Federal Government
Defense, resolution of international disputes, international trade, and
international environmental matters clearly meet the national public good test;
they are thus appropriate subjects of federal jurisdiction, perhaps even of
supranational jurisdiction. Rivlin also places funding for scientific research
and promotion of technological development in federal hands on the ground
that individual states are unlikely to support them adequately on their own.9
This is at best a cryptic rationale. The very purpose of transferring these
responsibilities would be to allow competition among the states to determine
the "adequacy" of funding. If jurisdictional allocation were based on an
assessment of which level of government could provide the most adequate
funding, Rivlin's project of transferring jurisdiction to the states would
collapse. There will always be pressure for additional "adequate" funding
from the federal government.
Health financing by the federal government, as Rivlin proposes, does not
meet the national public good test well. Local priorities must be considered
6. Dirk Jarr6, Subsidiarity in Social Services Provision in Germany, 25 Soc. PoL'Y & ADMIN. 211
(1991); see also Robert Howse, Is Federalism the Future?: A Critical View, Paper Presented at the
Conference on Federalism and the Nation-State, University of Toronto 20 (June 4-6, 1992) (unpublished
paper, on file with author) (supporting funding of programs designed by community groups).
7. See Jacques Pelkmans, Governing European Union: From Prefederal to Federal Economic
Integration?, Paper Presented at the Conference on Federalism and the Nation-State, University of Toronto
35-36 (June 4-6, 1992) (as revised Jan. 1993) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
8. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Economic Federalism and the EC, Keynote Address at the Conference
on Federalism and the Nation-State, University of Toronto 3 (June 4-6, 1992) (transcript on file with
author). Given the actual range of public expenditure, this approach to subsidiarity would have to be
expanded to cover the provision of what might be called "quasi-private" goods. See ROBIN BOADWAY, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF POWERS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 35 (1992).
9. RIVLIN, supra note 1, at 153. Rivlin adds that states are unlikely to support "basic scientific
research" because benefits would spill over state lines. Id. at 12.
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in health care. Although the Canada Health Act sets out the framework of the
national health care system,' 0 over seventy percent of health care funds are
earmarked for the provinces." Provinces negotiate fee schedules with local
medical associations and approve budgets of individual hospitals. To be sure,
Rivlin does not rule out some combination of federal and state roles in health
care reform, but once we contemplate joint or overlapping functions, we need
a more sophisticated categorization of tasks.
Subsidiarity is in fact entirely consistent with a system of central policy
directives and local implementation. This is the principal model in European
integration.' 2 For instance, German federalism is based largely on a
combination of federal legislation and Lander administration. 3 Rivlin, on the
contrary, is anxious to eliminate state-administered federal mandates, because
she believes they add to public confusion about which level of government is
truly responsible. 4 Yet citizens may well choose to have national standards
coexist with state responsiveness to local needs. Combined federal and state
roles may better respond to popular will, as long as citizens are aware which
level of government is responsible for which task.
B. Tasks Assigned to State Governments
In some respects, the prosperity agenda to be assigned to the states can
also, in some respects, become an interstate trade barrier and weaken
economic union. Canadians have devoted considerable attention to this aspect
of skills training.' 5 One purpose of retraining is to encourage labor mobility
throughout the country, yet as Professor Howse has argued,
[t]he provincial perspective on training and adjustment is likely to focus on the needs of the
province's own economy, and not to be oriented to preparing workers to take employment
elsewhere in the country. Taxpayers in a given province are unlikely to want to invest in
another province's labour force.16
10. Canada Health Act, R.S.C., ch. C-6. (1985) (Can.).
11. The provincial share has grown, from a 66% share in 1978 to a 72% share in 1988. ISABELLA
D. HoRRY & MICHAEL A. WALKER, GOVERNMENT SPENDING FACTS app. 10-5 (1991).
12. See Renaud Dehousse, Integration v. Regulation? On the Dynamics of Regulation in the
European Community, 30 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 383 (1992); M. Rainer Lepsius, Beyond the Nation-
State: The Multinational State as the Model for the European Community, 91 TELos 57 (1992); Andrew
McGee & Stephen Weatherill, The Evolution of the Single Market - Harmonisation or Liberalisation, 53
MOD. L. REV. 578 (1990).
13. GG art. 83; see also DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTIrUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 107 (1989).
14. R~vLJN, supra note 1, at 30-31, 109.
15. ROBERTHOWSE, ECONOMICUNION, SOCIALJUSTICE, AND CONSTITUTIONALREFORM: TOWARDs
A HIGH BUT LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 106-08 (1992). See generally James B. Davies, Training and Skill
Development, in ADAPTING TO CHANGE: LABOUR MARKET ADJUSTMENT IN CANADA 163 (W. Craig
Riddell ed., 1985); MINISTRY OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES OF CANADA, 3 REPORT OF THE ROYAL
CoMMISsION ON THE ECONOMIC UNION AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR CANADA 170 (1985).
16. HowsE, supra note 15, at 106.
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The federal government therefore has an essential role in skills training.
Similarly, varying child care benefits, such as public-supported day-care or
parental leave, can cause disruptions in labor mobility, as can impediments to
transferring benefits like pension plans from one jurisdiction to another. In
addition, local economic development programs are notoriously prone to
"beggar-thy-neighbor" strategies. In the European context, the Treaty of
Rome17 supplements its principle of subsidiarity with a prohibition against
"state aids" that would distort competition by favoring local undertakings.18
This analysis by no means amounts to an argument for exclusive federal
jurisdiction over training, child care, or economic development. It does,
however, suggest that Rivlin's quest for "a cleaner distinction... between
the responsibilities of the federal government and those of the states" may be
quixotic. 9 Canada, for example, has recently attempted to streamline the
division of powers, in an effort to rid itself of a legal thicket of concurrency,
"double aspect," delegation, paramountcy, and "minimal impairment."20
In the October 1992 constitutional referendum, Canadian voters rejected
a proposal providing, among other things, for greater freedom to negotiate
limitations to federal jurisdiction. Partial or complete federal withdrawal from
labor market development and training, combined with compensation to the
province, was a central and controversial feature of the proposal. Yet even
this "decentralizing" proposal would have maintained crucial features of
national jurisdiction: the federal government would have been able to negotiate
a continued presence in the field, and the federal government, together with
the provinces, would have been required to establish national objectives in
relation to national aspects of labor market development programs and
activities, which would "tak[e] into account the different needs and circum-
stances of the provinces."21 Furthermore, federal jurisdiction to make
expenditures on job creation programs would have been preserved.' Some
continued jurisdictional overlap not only would have been endemic to the
scheme - it would have been a desirable feature of it.
To summarize, rethinking federalism, as Rivlin advocates, will require
more attention to the details of jurisdiction and to the kinds of jurisdictional
overlap that ought to be maintained. In Canadian constitutional law, the old
doctrine of jurisdictional "watertight compartments" in the ship of state has
become an anachronism. It cannot cope with the growing complexity of
agreements and arrangements among orders of government, to say nothing of
government agreements with private citizens and groups. The task, therefore,
17. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
18. See Conor Quigley, The Notion of State Aid in the EEC, 13 EuR. L. REv. 242 (1988).
19. RIVLIN, supra note 1, at 7.
20. See PETER W. HoGc, CONSTrruTirONAL LAW OF CANADA 371-434 (3d ed. 1992).
21. Charlottetown Accord, Aug. 28, 1992, § 11 (draft legal text on file with author) [hereinafter
Charlottetown Accord] (proposed addition to Constitution Act, 1867 as § 93C(2)).
22. Id. (proposed addition to Constitution Act, 1867 as § 93B(4)).
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is not so much to find a new set of separate compartments as it is to identify
appropriate principles by which relations among levels of government can be
managed.
]I. RACE TO THE BOTroM VS. RACE TO TM TOP
To the extent that authority is decentralized, the question is whether
rivalry among states will produce a race to the top or a race to the bottom:
will states attempt to attract business by taling steps to improve services or
by subsidizing businesses and relaxing, for example, environmental regula-
tions?' Rivlin posits that decentralization will produce a race to the top:
"Once clearly in charge, the states would compete vigorously with each other
to improve services and attract business by offering high-quality education,
infrastructure, and other services." '2 4 D.K. Tarullo's comments on the
European Community provide a rejoinder to this view:
Such competition is desirable where regions vie to offer better schools or transport systems,
or otherwise to enhance economic growth. But other forms of competition among regions
to attract private investment can erode social standards - competitive tax abatements,
wasteful subsidies or weakened environmental, health, or employment regulation opposed
by business interests.'
Canada has been plagued by race-to-the-bottom problems associated with tax
abatements and subsidies,' a race that now includes competition among
provinces and jurisdictions south of the border.
Rivlin's confidence that her scheme would produce a race to the top
seems to be based on three factors. First, she assumes that the sort of
jurisdiction she would assign to the states would create considerable private
demand for high levels of performance, particularly in education and
transport. This assumption, however, applies less well to other areas of
jurisdiction. Rivlin would assign to the states child care, economic develop-
ment, and training. Without national minimal standards, state programs in
these areas could be caught in a race to the bottom. Yet, if the federal
government is to impose such standards legitimately, it may well have to share
in the cost of the programs. Because such programs can be forms of business
subsidy, the federal government must maintain at least some residual role to
prevent subsidies that distort interstate trade. In Canada, the recent devolution
proposal was in part designed to strengthen the economic union by bolstering
23. See Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction,
34 HARv. IIT'L L.J. 47 (1993).
24. RIvuN, supra note 1, at 118.
25. Daniel K. Tarullo, Can the European 'Social Market' Survive 1992?, 5 AM. PRoSPEcr 61, 63
(1991).
26. See generally HowsE, supra note 15, at 102-04.
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constitutional protection for the free movement of persons, capital, goods, and
services.27
A second factor explaining Rivlin's confidence in the race to the top, even
absent national standards and prohibition of trade distorting subsidies, might
be that federal withdrawal from certain areas would be purely voluntary under
her scheme and not constitutionally mandated. In other words, states would
compete in a market for the provision of services that could be contested by
federal reassertion of jurisdiction.28 The mere threat of federal entry might
be sufficient to discipline anti-competitive state behavior. However, state
governments may prefer federal entry so as to have a scapegoat upon which
to blame their own failure to provide a subsidy or other favor. Moreover, if
competition depends upon the absence of barriers to entry, the high transac-
tion costs of the legislative process must be considered. Finally, a credible
threat of federal entry would require a stable pattern of constitutional
interpretation after federal withdrawal from a field of activity, for there is a
risk that the judiciary would not permit the reassertion of federal jurisdic-
tion.29
The third and most important factor explaining Rivlin's confidence in a
race to the top is that a new tax structure would put all states on a substan-
tially equal fiscal footing. Because Rivlin recognizes the race-to-the-bottom
dangers inherent in interstate competition to keep taxes low,3° she proposes
a system of common shared taxes to minimize this sort of danger. Competi-
tion to keep taxes low, however, is only one aspect of the race-to-the-bottom
problem. Indirect forms of subsidy, such as competition to lower pollution
standards, would not be addressed by a common tax scheme.31
27. CharlottetownAccord, supra note 21, § 31 (proposed addition to ConstitutionAct, 1982, R.S.C.,
app. II, no. 44 (1985) (Can.), as § 36.1(3)(a)). However, the new "Social and Economic Union" only
enshrined "policy objectives" that were to be monitored according to a mechanism to be specified at a
future date. Id.
28. Here, I am making an analogy to the "contestable market" hypothesis of Baumol, Panzar, and
Willig. They posit that the welfare problems posed by monopolistic anti-competitive behavior can be
solved as long as competitive pressure is exerted by potential entrants having no barriers to entry into the
market. Such a barrier-free market is contestable. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL.,
CONTFSTABLE MARKERS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUtmrU (1982). It should be noted that
central governments can be also guilty of imposing differential costs on various constituencies and playing
them off against each other. See, e.g., Pete du Pont, Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: Will States
Exist?, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 144-45 (1993).
29. Rivlin does not discuss the role of the judiciary in the expansion of federal jurisdiction, which
is somewhat surprising given her focus on recasting the division of powers. For a somewhat partisan
account of the judiciary's role in this context, see Lino A. Graglia, From Federal Union to National
Monolith: Mileposts in the Demise of American Federalism, 16 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 129 (1993).
30. Rivlin's analysis derives from Tiebout's work on local spending. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. PoL. EcoN. 416 (1956). Rivlin, however, expresses doubts about
whether individual mobility across state lines is heavily influenced by local tax rates. RIvLIN, supra note
1, at 137-38.
31. However, Rivlin would maintain some responsibility for transborder pollution control at the
federal level and thereby restrict the capacity of states to give indirect pollution subsidies. RIVLIN, supra
note 1, at 12.
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Rivlin's book canvasses various methods for achieving a common tax, but
one point in particular merits discussion. A guaranteed common fiscal
framework must be the linchpin to Rivlin's broad devolution proposal. Thus
it is in this context that she mentions, for the first and only time, the
possibility of constitutional amendment. She writes: "Drastic as such a
suggestion might seem, enshrining the common shared tax fund in a
constitutional amendment might be necessary to ensure its survival and
immunity from congressional tinkering. "32 Yet, recognizing the unlikelihood
of a constitutional amendment, she is still prepared to proceed with devolu-
tion.
The model for Rivlin's proposed constitutional amendment is the German
Basic Law. Chapter X of the Basic Law identifies with considerable precision
which level of government has access to which sources and which shares of
tax revenue. It also gives the Bundesrat, a body composed of representatives
of the Lander governments, a significant role in the oversight of federal
taxation.33 One important function of the German system is to equalize the
revenue base of rich and poor Lander. The system is currently under review
because of the growing disparities that came with unification.
Unlike Germany, Canada lacks a constitutional basis for fiscal harmoniza-
tion. It therefore exemplifies the pitfalls of proceeding to decentralization
without such a basis. 4 To be sure, Canada does have a constitutional basis
for the principle of equalization transfers from the federal to the provincial
governments, so that it has a more solid framework than the United States for
guaranteeing a large measure of fiscal equality. 5 Nevertheless, the problem
of tax rate differentials identified by Rivlin remains considerable in Canada.
The Canadian version of a value-added tax, the Goods and Services Tax
(GST), provides a cautionary tale. In enacting this highly unpopular tax, the
federal government sought to combine two of the approaches Rivlin outlines
for achieving a common shared tax. On the one hand, it created a uniform
national sales tax. On the other hand, it sought provincial agreement to
harmonize existing retail sales taxes with the federal tax. Just as Rivlin fears,
holdout provinces scuttled harmonization. Canadians now have the accounting
nightmare of administering two different forms of sales tax, one federal and
32. RIvLIN, supra note 1, at 149.
33. For a brief account, see RICHARD JANDA, RE-BALANCING THE FEDERATION THROUOH SENATE
REFORM: ANOTHER LOOK AT THE BUNDESRAT 14-16 (1992).
34. In the last round of constitutional discussions, the federal government proposed the establishment
of a Council of the Federation that would have the mandate "to vote on common guidelines for fiscal
harmonization and coordination, and make decisions on improved processes for collaboration in this area."
MMMY OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES OF CANADA, SHAPING CANADA'S FUTURE TOGETHER: PROPOSALS
42 (1991).
35. Boadway discusses why the existing scheme does not fully achieve fiscal equality. See
BOADWAY, supra note 8, at 46.
Reviving Federalism
the other provincial, together with variations among the provinces on the tax
rates and tax base."
Thus, although Rivlin recognizes the race-to-the-bottom problem, her
partial solution to it, common shared taxes, will be difficult to achieve. Rivlin
acknowledges this difficulty, but does not recognize the degree to which it
renders her decentralization program tenuous. Canada offers mixed results on
common shared taxes. Although Canadians benefitted from a significant
equalization program even before adopting explicit constitutional guarantees,
they have been unable to achieve tax harmonization.
IV. THE DANGERS OF OFF-LOADING THE FEDERAL DEFICIT
Dr. Rivlin is prepared to back decentralization even in the absence of
fiscal guarantees to the states, because she believes, first, that the states will
be better able to persuade voters of the need for tax increases37 and, second,
that harmonization can be achieved incrementally.38 However, one should not
underestimate the danger that the states will find the deficit simply transferred
to them.
Canada provides an example of this problem. Beginning with the 1989
budget, the federal government sought to limit the size of transfers to the
provinces.3 9 First, the federal government capped the largest program of
unconditional transfers, referred to as Established Programme Financing,
which provides assistance for health care and post-secondary education. Next,
the federal government unilaterally reduced funding for the Canada Assistance
Plan (CAP), a program through which the federal government reimbursed the
provinces for fifty percent of their "eligible expenditures" for assistance to
persons in need. As a shared-cost program, CAP had operated under a
federal-provincial agreement. Not surprisingly, the provinces protested the
federal government's expenditure reduction of the program, and, in a recent
landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the federal
government was unfettered in its power to break funding commitments.'
The proposed constitutional amendment defeated in the 1992 referendum
36. For an account of GST harmonization, see Stanley L. Winer, Taxation and Federalism in a
Changing World, in TAXATION TO 2000 AND BEYOND, CANADIAN TAX PAPER No. 93, at 343 (Richard
M. Bird & Jack M. Mintz eds., 1992). See also Charles E. McLure, Jr., What Can the United States
Learn from the Canadian Sales Tax Debate, in CANADA-U.S. TAX COMPARISONS 295 (John B. Shoven
& John Whalley eds., 1992).
37. RIVriN, supra note 1, at 16 ('Perhaps taxpayers are clearer about their need for state and local
services and are more willing to pay for them than for the more remote services of the federal
government.").
38. Id. at 152. ("Cooperation on common taxes might start in a small way - say with catalog sales
or professional services - and then spread to a larger portion of the tax base.").
39. See DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE OF CANADA, BUDGET PAPERS 13 (1989).
40. Reference re: Canada Assistance Plan, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 297 (1991).
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would have enshrined a general mechanism for rendering intergovernmental
agreements enforceable.4
Taking into account transfers from the federal government, the provinces
have received the largest share of revenue since the early 1960s.42 By 1988,
their share had levelled off at about sixty-five percent.43 Such support
enabled the provincial governments to operate on nearly balanced budgets
through the late 1980s.1 However, the imposition of federal caps on
transfers in 1989 to the provinces has seriously worsened their fiscal position.
By the end of the third quarter of 1992, the combined deficit of the ten
provincial governments reached Can$24.9 billion, nearly equivalent to that of
the federal government, which stood at Can$28.8 billion.45 Provinces have
been raising taxes and cutting expenditures, but voters are no more receptive
to these provincial measures than they were to federal tax increases and
spending cuts.
Rivlin would likely say that the key difference between the revenue
position of the American states and that of the Canadian provinces is that most
states are required by state constitutions to maintain balanced budgets, which
is unheard of in Canada.46 In other words, decentralization in the United
States would have the virtue of transferring spending from a level of
government that need not maintain a balanced budget to one that must.
According to James Savage, the constitutions of forty-three states have
balanced budget amendments.47 Nevertheless, states have managed to
generate significant state debts through off-budget spending or non-guaranteed
borrowing by issuing state agency revenue bonds, borrowing through public
corporations, delegating state operations to local governments and agencies,
and using lease-purchase agreements. 41 James Bennett and Thomas DiLor-
enzo have documented the growing portion of state debt accounted for by non-
guaranteed debt, a form of debt more expensive to finance than guaranteed
debt.49 They go so far as to argue that state balanced budget amendments
41. Charlottetown Accord, supra note 21, art. 26. Agreements would have had a maximum five year
duration. Id.
42. See Winer, supra note 36, at 346 fig. 10.2.
43. Id.
44. See S. DAmIuS, CANADA'S PUBLIc SECTOR: A GRAPHiC OvERvmw 6 (1992) (charting federal,
provincial, and local government budgetary surpluses and deficits).
45. ECONOMIST INTELIGENCE UNrr oF CANADA, COUNTRY REPORT, No. 1, 1993, at 11.
46. See RiVIN, supra note 1, at 14. ("Because, unlike the federal government, states and localities
cannot normally borrow to cover operating expenses, they are forced to raise taxes and cut services as
soon as their reserves are exhausted.*).
47. See JAMES D. SAVAGE, BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENTS & AMERICAN PoLITIcs 117 tbl. 14
(1988). These amendments usually contain the following requirements: "(1) a nominal debt was allowed
to cover casual deficits; (2) beyond this, the consent of the people was required; and (3) the state might
not endorse obligations of others." Id. at 118, quoting BENJAMIN U. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE
DEBTs 122 (1941).
48. Id. at 238.
49. JAMEs T. BENNETT & THOMAS J. DiLORENZO, UNDERGROUND GOVERNMENT: THE OFF-
BUDGET PUBLIC SECTOR 92-94 tbl. 15 (1983) (noting total of over $39 billion by 1977).
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"have had very little impact on the expansion of the nonfederal public sector,"
because politicians "have managed to move large segments of the public sector
'off the books.""'5 Furthermore, voters have frequently approved the
issuance of state bonds rather than faced increased taxes, as the recent
California experience illustrates.5 Thus, it may be a mistake to rely upon
constitutionally required balanced budgets as a fiscal basis for decentralization.
Even given balanced budget amendments, devolving federal responsibilities
to the states may simply transfer the federal government's fiscal crisis to the
state level.
V. DECENTRALIZATION AND DEBT CONTROL
The final problem with Rivlin's analysis is her conviction that decentral-
ization will partially solve America's public debt problem as local efficiencies
develop and taxpayers show greater willingness to pay for clearly justified
state services.5 2 Canada is a good test case for this proposition because
decentralization along the lines suggested by Rivlin would lead to a structure
similar to the Canadian model. However, decentralization has not been of
substantial assistance in solving the debt problem in Canada.
In 1984, Canada's net public debt was 26.7% of its gross domestic
product (GDP), while the U.S. net public debt was 24.9% of GDP. By 1991,
the net public debt in Canada had grown to 49.2% of GDP, as compared to
34.7% in the United States.53 By 1990, interest payments on the debt, as a
percentage of total expenditures, were almost twice as high in Canada as in
the United States. 4 As Canada's debt was rising disproportionately faster,
interest payments were crowding out other expenditures to a higher degree.55
By any measure, Canada's debt problem is worse than that of the United
States. At the very least, one can conclude that decentralization has not been
of substantial assistance in solving the Canadian debt problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
Broadly speaking, Canada and the United States both developed the
division of federal and local authority that the founders of the other country
wanted. Conceived in the wake of the American Civil War, the British North
America Act56 reflected a will to produce a stronger central government than
50. William E. Simon, Epilogue to BENNETT & DiLORENzo, supra note 49, at 182.
51. See SAVAGE, supra note 47, at 239.
52. RIVLIN, supra note 1, at 16, 126, 179.
53. OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, Dec. 1992, at 143 tbl. 41.
54. For a discussion of the dynamics of the debt problem see Christopher Green, From 'Tax State'
to 'Debt State,' 3 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 23 (1993).
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was provided for in the U.S. Constitution. For example, Canada's trade and
commerce clause was deliberately drafted so that it would not be restricted to
interprovincial or international commerce. Residual power in Canada was
assigned to the federal government. Nevertheless, the realities of provincial
diversity and the caution of Canadian and British courts produced an
institutional structure more closely resembling what James Madison envisioned
than does the current organization of the U.S. federal government.
Indeed, even Alexander Hamilton imagined that the United States would
remain a largely decentralized polity. He wrote Federalist 17 in response to
the anti-Federalist contention that the new Constitution would set in motion
a process whereby the central government would tend to absorb the authority
granted to the states:
The superiority of influence in favor of the particular governments would result partly
from the diffusive construction of the national government, but chiefly from the nature of
the objects to which the attention of the State administrations would be directed.
.. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each State
would be apt to feel a stronger bias toward their local governments than towards the
government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much
better administration of the latterY
Perhaps in the United States, the force of that principle was destroyed by a
much better administration of the central government, at least since the New
Deal. Perhaps Rivlin is right. With the central government's administrative
ability seriously in doubt, it might be appropriate to return to the original
conception of American federalism and, in Hamilton's words, let government
"come home to the feelings of the people. " 58
Yet there is something technocratic and unconvincing about basing
federalism on specialists' predictions as to which level of government is the
most efficient spender. Federalism, after all, has the virtue of allowing
citizens to retain the plurality of their allegiances and providing multiple fora
for democratic debate. Pluralism and accountability commend to us the idea
of revitalizing federalism much more so than does a conviction that decentral-
ization produces fiscal responsibility. To paraphrase a former Canadian
premier, on a list of one hundred good reasons for federalism, debt control
would surely be number one hundred and one. If decentralization occurs
without an equalized and guaranteed fiscal base, it is likely to be a recipe for
exacerbating existing inequalities and crippling local governments. If, on the
other hand, Rivlin were to have her fondest wish - constitutionally
entrenched fiscal re-balancing along the lines of the German model - the true
virtues of federalism could flourish.
57. TBE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 119 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
58. Id. at 120.
